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With the impending crisis in care the tendency has been to consider what care services ought to be 
provided by the public sector and/or outsourced to the private sector, and how to appropriately regulate 
such providers.  Consequently the literature has focused on a mixture of social policy and regulatory 
analysis.  By contrast, in Informal Carers and Private Law Brian Sloan considers what private law remedies 
might be available to informal carers, that is, those who provide unpaid support to family or friends who 
require support due to old age, disability or some other reason.  By definition, the informal carers Sloan is 
concerned with haven’t formalised their relationship contractually – and given informal care often arises 
in the familial context one wouldn’t expect people to formalise their relationship.  On the other hand, 
promises of recompense and reward are sometimes made, care-recipients are receiving services that are 
otherwise costly, and care-givers give up much of their time and might come to expect some benefit – in 
particular what Sloan calls ‘pure carers’ who are not close relatives or the sexual partner of the care-
recipient (who we might expect to give care for free), but rather friends giving up much of their life to 
give care outside of formal arrangements. 
 
Sloan sets out three scenarios which he will examine through a variety of private law remedies: where ‘the 
care-recipient indicates in some way that the carer will receive some property or other benefit in return 
for his efforts, often on the death of the care recipient, and for some reason the relevant benefit fails to 
materialise’ (pp.20-21); where there is ‘no indication of a benefit for the carer’ (p.21); and ‘where a benefit 
(promised or not) is in fact transferred by a grateful care recipient to her carer but the transfer is later 
challenged by the care recipient or (more likely) her estate’ (p.21).  The majority of the book concerns the 
first two scenarios, where the carer doesn’t receive any benefit. In fact much of the discussion is oriented 
towards the situation where the care-recipient has died and hasn’t given the carer any benefit either during 
her lifetime or in her will.  The prominence of testamentary relief is hardly surprising given that care-
recipients may not have the means during their lifetime to provide a benefit and in many cases the benefit 
is property or some portion thereof.  The first scenario broadly maps on to what Sloan – drawing on the 
language of equity - calls ‘unconscionability of dealing’, where there has been a promise or other 
indication that the carer would receive a benefit but that benefit isn’t forthcoming. This is in contrast to 
what Sloan calls ‘unconscionability of outcome’, which concerns undesirable outcomes in the absence of 
any promise of any benefit to the carer corrected by way of a redistribution of wealth. The core question 
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for Sloan is ‘whether private law remedies for carers do, can and should, address unconscionability of 
dealing or unconscionability of outcome’ (p.21). 
 
Chapters 2 to 4 deal with unconscionability of dealing, chapters 5 and 6 deal with unconscionability of 
outcome, and chapter 7 deals with the third scenario (which might be understood in terms of 
unconscionability of dealing, but unconscionability on the part of the carer rather than the care-recipient). 
In chapter 2 Sloan considers what property claims might be available to carers through proprietary 
estoppel and, to a lesser degree, constructive trusts.  Proprietary estoppel can provide remedies to carers 
where there is a promise or other representation giving rise to a belief that they will obtain an interest in 
property, but it has certain limitations: it seems to be limited to property promises; moreover the carer 
must then continue to act to their detriment because of the representation, and not for some other reason 
(although it doesn’t have to be the sole reason for acting); and it also gives rise to certain policy concerns 
regarding circumvention of formality requirements for disposition of interests in land and testamentary 
dispositions. The latter point is taken up in chapter 3 where Sloan considers New Zealand’s Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949, which he explains ‘facilitates the granting of discretionary remedies in 
respect of testamentary promises relating to work or services’ (p.91).  Here Sloan sets out the 
requirements for making a claim under the Act, and concludes that the Act ‘successfully circumvents 
many of the most serious difficulties presented by the modern law of estoppel in England as far as the 
informal carer is concerned’ (p.119).  Chapter 4 discusses unjust enrichment and the possibility of 
obtaining a monetary remedy for the provision of services.  Sloan notes that although the provision of 
care could be analysed as an ‘enrichment’, a particular difficulty facing a carer in establishing such a claim 
is determining what the ‘unjust factor’ is, particularly as the carer could be conceived as a domestic risk-
taker who had voluntarily assumed caring responsibilities (pp.124-125). 
 
Turning to unconscionability of outcome, in chapters 5 and 6 Sloan considers the availability of provision 
on death, under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act 1975, and a brief 
consideration of the possibility of inter vivos provision following the breakdown of caring relationships by 
analogy with the law relating to relationship breakdown for both spouses and cohabitants.  Regarding 
provision on death, Sloan explains that informal carers who are family members will generally be eligible 
for provision under the 1975 Act whereas ‘pure carers’ face difficulties in establishing eligibility.  Sloan 
provides a thorough engagement with the literature on the purposes of the law of succession, and the 
justifications for interfering with testamentary freedom, and concludes that ‘since society is content to 
interfere with testamentary freedom to provide for certain individuals with a connection to the deceased, 
“pure” carers should in principle be eligible for discretionary provision from a care recipient’s estate’ 
(p.203). Chapter 7 reverses the discussion and looks at the protection of care-recipients from the undue 
influence of carers when making gifts.  What’s interesting in this chapter is that Sloan considers how 
undue influence may actually be a ‘blockage’ to providing carers with benefits in being overly officious in 






setting aside transactions.  As he explains, ‘[t]he fetter of undue influence is often a beneficial one given 
the inherent vulnerability of the care recipient. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the 
doctrine can override the autonomy of a legally competent care recipient, effectively through the actions 
of her estate’ (p.238).  It’s difficult to see how undue influence is overriding autonomy though, as the 
point of undue influence is to undo transactions that haven’t met equity’s standards for assessing 
autonomy.   
 
In the final chapter Sloan turns his focus to the normative aspect of his distinction between 
unconscionability of dealing and unconscionability of outcome.  The problem, as Sloan conceives it, is 
that while remedying unconscionability of dealing is generally seen as unproblematic as promises have 
been made and expectations created such that the carer-giver is less of a risk-taker, unconscionability of 
outcome entails remedialism and distributive justice such that it affects the autonomy of the care-recipient 
– particularly their testamentary freedom to choose not to give any benefits - in circumstances where the 
carer can be conceived as a risk-taker.  Sloan concludes that although unconscionability of dealing is 
effectively dealt with by proprietary estoppel, the uncertainty of such principles coupled with the policy 
concerns regarding circumventing formality requirements suggest that the UK should adopt a statutory 
remedy similar to New Zealand (p.240).  An approach solely concerned with unconscionability of dealing 
though would exclude a large number of carers, ie those to whom no promises or assurances have been 
made, so Sloan adds that despite political concerns with distributive justice ‘English law should do more 
to recognise the carer as a category of applicant in his own right’ under the Inheritance (Provision for 
Family and Dependants) Act 1975 so as to deal with unconscionability of outcome (p.242).  
 
Informal Carers and Private Law occupies a difficult territory between doctrinal legal analysis and social 
policy.  While it provides an interesting and extensive analysis of the possible availability of a variety of 
private law claims, the normative aspects of the discussion beg a number of questions, not least why 
extend private law redress for informal carers, as Sloan concludes?  Although Sloan at one point sets aside 
issues of social policy concerning the balance between formal state provision and informal private 
provision of care, distinguishing them from the legal issues with which he is concerned (p.19), he also 
explicitly includes the normative question of whether private law remedies should address 
unconscionability of dealing and unconscionability of outcome.  In doing so part of the consideration 
must be the excluded social policy arguments: in part the justification for intervention will shape the 
nature, form and measure of any relief that ought to be given, so consideration of the normative 
foundations of relief would seem necessary; in part the justification for private law redress depends on the 
availability (or lack thereof) of State provision.  In the first chapter Sloan sets out the social policy context 
of his study and the arguments for private law support for carers.  Following a brief discussion of the 
arguments in favour of State support for carers and the existing framework of State support, Sloan 
considers a variety of justifications for private law remedies to recognise informal care, including the need 






to reduce the burden on the State (pp.12-13); the fact that care gives rise not only to a social debt but also 
to individual debts that should be repaid1 (p.15); that giving too much credence to altruism doesn’t 
account for the modern economy-driven world we live in (p.16); that simply treating care as inherent to 
familial relationships might lead to an under-appreciation of informal care by society (p.16); questioning 
just how voluntary informal care really is (p.17); and in the conclusion Sloan puts more emphasis on the 
need to encourage informal care (p.239).  However, he doesn’t reach any concrete conclusion.  Instead he 
states that private law remedies may sometimes be necessary (presumably due to a lack of State provision 
or compensation) (p.18); an expectation of remuneration is sometimes reasonable, as is the idea that the 
care-recipient meet that expectation (p.18); and, from a pragmatic perspective, remedies are in fact being 
awarded and denied (p.20).  The final sentence however goes much further: ‘[T]he strain under which 
societal resources will be placed and the need for justice for informal carers render it vital at least seriously 
to consider the specific recognition of such carers within private law, even in the absence of unconscionable 
dealing and even for entirely altruistic carers’ (pp.245-246, my emphasis).  Here we have two clear but 
questionable justifications. First ‘the need for justice’, even for altruistic informal carers, but it isn’t clear 
what the demand for ‘justice’ is. After all, to many informal carers the very suggestion of payment can be 
regarded as offensive. Secondly, private law should be used to take some of the burden away from State 
provision. But this returns us to the very question of social policy which Sloan wants to bracket, and 
highlights the link in political rationality between extending private redress and the dismantling of the 
welfare state underpinned by the discourse of Big Society, with which carers have been associated (p.3).  
The politics underpinning Informal Carers and Private Law is very much the Coalition’s politics of austerity: 
an extension of private redress is necessary because State provision must be cut back.  Without the 
detailed consideration of the relationship between justifications for, and extension of, private law redress 
and State support, what we are left with is a thinly articulated assumption that sometimes informal carers 
(but who, when and why?) should obtain some sort of redress (but in what form and measure?), and that in 
fact some informal carers can and do get some redress.  But if they are to get a remedy, at least in terms of 
proprietary estoppel, constructive trusts and unjust enrichment, it is not because they are carers as such but 
because something happened that would in any case give rise to a private law remedy.  
 
One of the most striking aspects of Informal Carers and Private Law is the pervasiveness of the language and 
doctrines of equity: from Sloan’s adoption of the language of unconscionability to the analysis of 
proprietary estoppel, constructive trusts, undue influence and unconscionable bargain, equity permeates 
this text.  It perhaps shouldn’t be surprising, given equity developed so many private law remedies, but 
more pertinently because in many respects equity is the jurisdiction of care par excellence, ranging from care 
for the King’s conscience to an historical and pastoral concern with the vulnerable and exploited, with 
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‘infants, lunatics and married women’.2  This view of equity has been much criticised, from both liberal-
economic and feminist perspectives.  The liberal-economic criticism is that far from demonstrating an 
altruistic attitude, ‘equity’s doctrines are more easily explained in efficiency terms’ and underpinned by the 
self-interested individual.3  More important for present purposes though are the criticisms in the feminist 
literature, for example that although equity may have provided some modest protection to married 
women, equity also subverted those rights, and that equitable remedies reinforce a number of stereotypes 
in its construction of female subjectivity.4  In this way equity constructs Woman as vulnerable, and 
consequently in need of care (and sometimes as ‘homemaker’ and therefore in need of protection against 
the Man of Property) – along with those others operating under a ‘special disability’, such as infants and 
lunatics.  What’s all this got to do with Sloan’s book?  After all, with the exception of the chapter on 
undue influence, here equity isn’t intervening due to the care-recipient’s vulnerability but rather to provide 
remedies for the informal carer, that is equity is caring for the carer.  However it is the way in which Sloan 
assesses the availability of private law remedies for carers by analogy with the parties in the equitable cases 
discussed that is important.  Due to the poverty of ‘care’ cases in proprietary estoppel and constructive 
trust Sloan draws on the cases he considers provide the closest fit, as he does when he analogises informal 
carers to the position of cohabitants in considering inter vivos relief for breakdown of caring relationships.  
In so doing, it is necessary to conceive the carer as in some way vulnerable and the care-recipient as in 
some way exploitative.5  It is also problematic because a number of the cases Sloan draws on are women’s 
claims to redress, often in the context of cohabitation, so Sloan is reasoning by analogy from a particular 
form of subjectivity, that has been critiqued in feminist literature, to the informal carer – in this sense, and 
in spite of Sloan’s choice to refer to the carer in the male gender and the care-recipient in the female, the 
informal carer’s work resembles women’s work and in this way channels a particular strand of discourse 
emanating from feminist claims concerning the recognition of informal and household labour without the 
necessary political and theoretical consideration of the relationship between the claims and concerns of 
women and informal carers.6  It’s not that analogies shouldn’t be drawn – it’s unavoidable and the very 
nature of legal argument – but it is important to recognise the politics of subjectivity involved in 
discussing informal carers’ claims for redress through the idiom and doctrines of equity.7 
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Despite its problems, though, Informal Carers and Private Law carries important potential: it provides a way 
of thinking about informal care issues, and consequently social policy, through the categories and 
concepts of private law. For example, in the chapter on proprietary estoppel the concepts of ‘expectation’ 
and ‘detrimental reliance’ provided useful frames through which to think how informal care is conceived, 
experienced and enacted.  Likewise in the chapter on unjust enrichment the discussion of ‘enrichment’ 
requires thought about the form and measure of the enrichment, which touches on the difficult but 
underexplored question of the measure of value,8 while the discussion of ‘unjust factors’ gets right to the 
heart of the discussion as to when a remedy reversing any enrichment will be awarded – the different 
‘unjust factors’ themselves provide a possible language for thinking these justifications, reversing the usual 
priority of moralistic justifications being translated into legal forms.  So perhaps Informal Carers and Private 
Law should be read not as a dry, doctrinal analysis of the availability of certain private law remedies in the 
context of informal care or an argument for the extension of private redress, but rather an example of 
how private law can provide language and concepts for political thought.  In this sense, Informal Carers and 
Private Law can be read as a contribution to jurisprudence. 
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